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Abstract
In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex-
cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of 
commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This 
result is instructive to R&D and competition policy. 
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Introduction
In an influential work, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show 
that entry in oligopolistic markets is socially excessive in 
the presence of scale economies, providing the rationale for 
anti-competitive entry regulation in oligopolistic markets. 
This result, often called “excess-entry theorem”, has 
created significant interest in analyzing the welfare effects 
of entry in oligopolistic markets1. Although it is generally 
believed for long time that entry is socially excessive in 
oligopolistic industries with scale economies, recent 
contributions show concern to this belief by considering 
spatial competition (Matsumura and Okamura 2006), 
market powers of the intermediate goods producers 
and the final goods producers (Ghosh and Morita, 2007a 
and b), technology licensing (Mukherjee and Mukherjee 
2008), external economies of scale (Mukherjee, 2010) 
and market leadership (Mukherjee, 2011b).
The “excessive-entry” literature has been extended 
is several directions in recent years, yet an important 
aspect, viz., endogenous technology choice of the firms, 
did not get much attention. The previous works in this 
literature consider that the technology choice of the 
firms are  not affected by the market structure, while it 
is well-known that market structure plays an important 
role in determining the technologies of the firms 
(Schumpeter, 1943 and Arrow, 1962)2. De Bondt (1997) 
provides a critical survey of wide class settings including 
stochastic racing model, dynamic and static commitment, 
and strategic investment model that look at spillovers in 
innovative activity.
In the literature on non-Tournaments R&D, Poyago-
Theotoky (1999) explores the information sharing 
behavior among firms with endogenous spillover effects. 
Based on Poyago-Theotoky (1999), Tesoriere (2006) also 
endogenizes spillover effects in non-Tournament R&D 
model and further considers the possibility of asymmetric 
spillover effect to elaborate the optimality in a research 
joint venture.  Nisvan and Piccinin (2010) analyze the 
effects of cooperative R&D arrangements in a model which 
allows for free entry into both the product market and the 
stochastic R&D process with spillovers. They show that 
sharing of research outcomes is a necessary condition for 
the profitability of cooperative R&D arrangements with 
free entry.
In this paper, we consider a situation where the patent 
system makes the R&D process as a tournament (Roy 
Chowdhury, 2005, Zhou, 2006, Mukherjee, 2006 and 
Mukherjee, 2008), where only one successful firm in R&D 
is granted patent for the new innovated technology3. We 
show that if there is R&D tournament, entry is socially 
excessive irrespective of small and large knowledge 
spillovers or non-infringing imitations, which help the 
non-patent holders to get the advantage of the technology 
used by the patent holder4.   
Due to common intellectual property protection schemes 
around the world, R&D competition is often Tournament-
liked. It is to say that there is one and only one can 
ultimately be entitled the privilege of owning the patent. 
Therefore, IPR policies and competition policies towards 
the industries without legal entry barriers should be 
carefully designed to prevent this double-whammy effect. 
The remainder of the paper is structures as follows. 
Section 2 describes the model and shows the result. 
Section 3 concludes.
1 See, Von Weizsäcker (1980), Suzumura and Kiyono (1987), Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) for other 
works on excessive entry in the presence of scale economies. Klemperer (1988), Lahiri and Ono (1988) and Ghosh and Saha (2007) suggest 
that excessive entry can occur without scale economies but in the presence of marginal cost difference.
2 Klemperer (1988), Lahiri and Ono (1988) and Ghosh and Saha (2007) show the welfare effects of entry in the presence of exogenously 
given cost asymmetry but with no scale economies, yet the extent of cost asymmetry does not depend on the market structure. Recently, 
Mukherjee (2011a) endogenize cost asymmetry by considering one innovating and all other non-innovating firms, thus ignoring strategic 
investment in innovation. In contrast to these papers, we consider strategic R&D investments of the firms in the present paper.
3 See Zhou ( 2006). It examines first the relation between the R&D process that represented by the form of uncertainty and the market 
structure as well as contestants’ R&D spending. The research than illustrates the relation between the magnitude of the spillover effect 
and the contestants’ R&D spending.
4 Haruna and Goel (2011) consider social efficiency of entry in the presence of R&D competition between the firms, and show that 
excessive entry occurs as long as research spillovers are relatively small, but that is not necessarily the case with large spillovers.
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2. The model and the results
Assume that there is large number of firms who can enter 
the market by incurring an entry cost E. Each firm can 
produce a homogeneous product with a marginal cost 
d. We assume that, ex-post entry, each firm invests in 
research to invent a new technology, which reduces its 
marginal cost of production to c. For simplicity, we ignore 
the cost of research, since it will not add new insights to 
our analysis. Success in research is certain. However, we 
assume that only one innovator will get the patent for the 
new invented technology. The patent owner will invest 
in developing or commercializing the new technology. 
If the patent owner invests x amount in developing the 
technology, it can reduce the marginal cost relating to 
the new technology to (c – x). We assume that the cost of 
developing the new technology is X2. We also assume that 
the non-patent owners can get the benefit of the patent 
holder’s technology through knowledge spillover or non-
infringing imitation, which reduces the marginal cost of a 
non-patent owner to (c – gx), where g            is the degree 
of knowledge spillover as specified in D’aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988)5. Hence, g may show the effectiveness 
of the patent system. 
We consider the following game. At stage 1, the firms 
decide whether to enter the industry. At stage 2, the 
firms, which have entered the market, conducts research 
and invents the new technology. At stage 3, the patent is 
granted to one innovator. At stage 4, the patent owner 
invests in developing the new invented technology. At 
stage 5, the firms, which have entered the market, choose 
their outputs simultaneously and the profits are realized.
We will consider d = c in the following analysis, in order 
to abstract our analysis from the initial cost asymmetries 
of the patent owner and the non-patent owners, thus 
showing the implications of R&D tournament only6. 
Hence, we can consider our situation as follows. The 
existing technologies of the firms are standardized and 
there are no scopes for improving them. The new invented 
technology is similar to that of the existing technologies 
without development, yet there is scope for improving 
the new technology.  
[0,1]!
5 As in De Bondt (1997), spillovers will here be equivalent to knowledge spillovers: involuntary leakage or voluntary exchange of useful 
technology information.
6The effects of the initial cost asymmetries between an innovator and the non-innovators have been discussed in Mukherjee (2011a).
We assume that the inverse market demand function is
                                                                                 (1)
where P is price and q is the total output.
If n firms enter the market, the ith firm’s profit, 
1,2,...,i n=  1, 2,...,i n=   , is
                                                                                 (2)
Let us explain expression (2), which shows the ith firm’s 
net expected profit from innovation. If n firms enter 
the market and innovate the technology, the ith firm’s 
probability of becoming the patent owner is 
1
n   . If the 
ith firm is the patent owner and invests ix  in developing 
the technology, its marginal cost of production is   and the 
marginal cost of each of the other (n – 1) firms is (c – gxi ). 
Hence, the ith firm’s expected profit from patent approval is
                                                    .
The probability that the ith firm is not the patent owner is 
__  . If the firms other than the firm i owns the patent 
and invests X_i’  , the marginal cost of the firm becoming 
the patent owner is (c – x_i ) and each of the other firm’s 
(including firm i) is (c – gx_i ) . Hence, the expected profit 
of the ith firm from not owning the patent is
                                                 .
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The equilibrium number of firms, which enters the 
industry, is given by --- --- . Given the complicated 
expression in (3), we focus on two extreme situations: 
(i) where the patent system is completely effective, 
i.e., g = 0, and (ii) where the patent system is not effective 
at all, i.e., g = 1.
First, consider the case where g = 0. In this situation, the 
equilibrium investment in developing the new technology 
is                       and the equilibrium number of 
firms entering the industry is given by              or 
                 
Next, consider the case where g = 1. In this situation, the 
equilibrium investment in developing the new technology 
is                     and the equilibrium number of firms 
entering the industry is given by                     or         
2.1. Welfare maximizing number of firms
Now consider the welfare maximizing number of the 
firms entering the industry. The expected welfare of the 
economy is given by the sum of expected consumer surplus 
and the net expected profits of the all firms entering the 
industry. Given the symmetry of the firms, the identity 
Firm i maximizes (1) to determine its investment in 
developing the technology. Due to the symmetry of the 
firms, we get the equilibrium investment by each firm, 
which has entered the industry, in developing the invented 
technology as
                   (3)
If n firms enter the industry, the net profit of each firm is
                                                                                     (4)
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of the firm getting the patent protection is not important 
for welfare. Since at least one firm owns the patent, if n 
firms enter the industry, and therefore, each firm invests in 
developing the new technology according to (3), welfare is
                                                                             (5) 
where
shows the consumer surplus. Using (3), (4) and (5), we get 
the welfare as
(6)
Now consider the two extreme cases of g = 0 and g = 1. 
If g = 0, welfare is
                                             and the welfare maximizing 
number of firms is given by
                     
Next, consider the case of g = 1. In this situation, welfare is
and the welfare maximizing number of firms is given by
2.2. Excess entry
Now we consider whether entry is excessive or insufficient 
from the social point of view.
First, consider the case of g = 0. Subtracting the left 
hand side (LHS) of the equation determining the welfare 
maximizing number of firms from LHS of the equation for 
the free entry equilibrium number of firms, we get that
                                                               , implying that 
entry is socially excessive.
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Next, consider the case of g = 1. Subtracting LHS of the 
equation determining the welfare maximizing number 
of firms from LHS of the equation for the free entry 
equilibrium number of firms, we get that
implying that entry is socially excessive.
Thus, we show that entry is socially excessive under both 
low and high knowledge spillovers in the presence of R&D 
tournament. The economic reason for this difference is 
as follows. In contrast to R&D competition, where all the 
successful firms use the invented technology, only one 
successful firm gets the patent for the new technology 
under R&D tournament. Therefore, even the possibility 
of becoming the sole patent-holder may create significant 
interest for entering the industry but paradoxically the 
patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent 
holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and 
further technology development, while the other firms 
are beneficiaries of the spillover effect. The society would 
suffer from the problem of excessive entry accordingly.
3. Conclusion
Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show that entry in 
oligopolistic markets is socially excessive in the presence 
of scale economies, providing the rationale for anti-
competitive entry regulation in oligopolistic markets. 
Considering R&D tournament with free entry and 
knowledge spillover, we show that the society would 
suffer from the problem of excessive entry and the patent 
holder would endure lower profits than non-patent 
holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and 
further technology development, while the other firms 
are beneficiaries of the spillover effects.
Due to common intellectual property protection schemes 
around the world, R&D competition is often Tournament-
liked. Therefore, IPR policies and competition policies 
towards the industries without legal entry barriers should 
be carefully designed to prevent this double-whammy effect.
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